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set the development strategy and developmental entrepreneurs implement it 
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Introduction
Unlike standard schemes of developmental cooperation, EU development 
aid to the former Soviet Union has been entangled with the recipient’s insti-
tutions. Instead of concentrating on the provision of grants and loans to 
federal or regional budgets, EU aid bureaucrats have worked collectively 
with federal, regional, and local bureaucrats in the former Soviet Union to 
achieve common policy ends. Aid effectiveness may be evaluated not only 
in terms of the foreign policy preferences of the donor, but also in terms of 
the economic policy preferences of the recipient. In the formal section of 
this paper, I focus on the analysis of EU aid effectiveness as an infinitely 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with imperfect monitoring.
I define aid effectiveness as contractual completeness (Grigoriadis, 
2011). An aid program is effective when its contractual conditions are met 
by the recipient. The direct welfare effects of aid are not a critical question 
in this paper; rather than exploring whether the low-income tail of the popu-
lation distribution becomes better off with the implementation of aid pro-
jects, I approach development aid as a consolidating factor of domestic state 
capacity (Akram, 2003). The aid–trade relationship is not as profitable for 
the recipient as it is for the donor; while export-oriented trade policies are a 
sufficient condition for high growth rates, they do not satisfy the recipient-
induced aid intentionality (Krueger, 1980). Because it is usually the case 
that the recipient is rich in raw materials and the donor in services and tech-
nologically advanced commodities, development aid is inclined to offset the 
recipient’s losses from trade. EU development aid—more than any other 
form of development assistance—advances the commercial interests of the 
EU member-states by committing to aid contracts which reduce the recipi-
ent’s financial dependence in the long run.
This contradictory set of incentives can be explained if one looks more 
closely at the literature on aid effectiveness. As Olson points out, rapid eco-
nomic growth should not be the imminent goal of aid programs (Olson, 1963). 
Rather than treating the public sector as a necessary evil in the aid implemen-
tation process, EU aid bureaucrats work primarily on aid contracts that facili-
tate the provision of public goods by the recipient government, and thus 
advance its administrative capacity and quality of welfare provision (Krueger, 
1986). Collier and Dollar, in their comprehensive review of aid effectiveness, 
contend that aid does not induce policy change and in fact the opposite is 
likely—policy reform can create a favorable environment for the successful 
implementation of aid contracts (Collier and Dollar, 2004: 255–264).
This paper has a two-fold purpose. First, it proposes a model that adds to 
a research program started with the treatment of EU development aid as a 
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soft budget constraint (Grigoriadis, 2011, 2013). Second, it elaborates on 
the term transnational sovereignty partnership (Grigoriadis, 2011). A trans-
national sovereignty partnership is a recipient institution composed of a 
post-Soviet bureaucracy and a consortium of developmental NGOs that 
implement the assigned aid contract. Its financing depends exclusively on 
the EU development aid. It is assumed that post-Soviet aid bureaucrats dis-
tribute financial resources with the purpose of maintaining a minimum of 
social subsistence to their poorest group of citizens;1 aid implementation 
becomes feasible with the donor’s supervision and the recipient’s adminis-
trative accountability. This is why post-Soviet aid bureaucrats are defined as 
distributive planners (Grigoriadis, 2011). Developmental NGOs and busi-
nesses are agents rather than counterbalancing institutions of governmental 
policy; they do not complement the absence of state capacity, but reinforce 
the government’s role as provider of public and social services.2 This takes 
place at the expense of transparency and democratic accountability.
Unlike the soft budget constraint model, which maps aid delivery as a 
two-period extensive game, my model here is a Prisoner’s Dilemma with an 
infinite time horizon and private signals as strategies. Moreover, both 
actors—the European Union as the donor and the transnational sovereignty 
partnership (TSP) as the recipient—decide simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. The donor does not know whether the recipient actually imple-
ments the aid contract or not; nor does the recipient know whether the donor 
will continue financing the aid contract with him or another TSP.
The TACIS program in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet 
Union provided long-term incentives for the strategic adjustment of post-
Soviet recipient bureaucracies to the aid delivery conditions proposed by 
the European Commission. The formation of transnational sovereignty 
partnerships between central or regional bureaucracies on the one hand, 
and business or NGO consortia on the other facilitated the institutional 
commitment of both the donor and the recipient toward aid effectiveness. 
This is why modeling the completeness of TACIS contracts as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma with imperfect signals is an appropriate research strategy that 
treats the increase of the recipient’s bureaucratic capacity not only as an 
outcome equivalent to the standard definition of aid effectiveness, but also 
as an inherent component of the development aid process. Evidence from 
TACIS contracts in Russian social policy suggests that EU development 
aid has been effective to the extent that the aid delivery services of European 
and Russian NGOs were coordinated with the policy priorities of the coun-
try’s central political institutions, such as the State Duma, and the relevant 
administrative agencies. This implies that aid effectiveness in its proce-
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dural form leads to the recipient’s multifaceted involvement in aid imple-
mentation, and therefore makes contractual completeness more likely.
In this paper, I focus on the mutual informational asymmetry between 
the donor and the recipient rather than the complex organizational forms 
that the recipient takes in the post-Soviet administrative environment. 
Hence, contrary to the soft budget constraint model under perfect infor-
mation, the donor can only infer from the recipient’s private signals if the 
latter has completed the aid contract or not. Similarly, the recipient can 
only infer from the donor’s private signals if the latter plans to keep refi-
nancing, reject refinancing, or start refinancing another TSP for the same 
aid project. The donor needs to compute the cost of noncompletion by the 
recipient; the same holds for the recipient, who also needs to estimate the 
cost of his bankruptcy in case the donor signals that he does not intend to 
refinance him or that he intends to continue with another business. 
Important here are the institutional specificities of the TACIS Program 
which operated between 1992 and 2007 and relied on project aid and col-
laborative state–society mechanisms rather than grants or budget 
support.
Modeling the implementation of TACIS contracts in the former Soviet 
Union as an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests that aid 
effectiveness occurs when the European Commission as the donor can 
credibly make the threat to the current TSP that it will continue the imple-
mentation of the TACIS contract with another TSP, if the first TSP has not 
fulfilled its contractual obligations in the current period. The internal 
structure of the TSP as a composite of the recipient’s bureaucracy on the 
one hand and a consortia of NGOs or businesses of the donor and the 
recipient on the other implies that the European Commission can choose 
from a sequence of TSPs in order to have the TACIS contract implemented 
in any time period (Grigoriadis, 2011). Thus, the TSP is always incentiv-
ized to signal contract completion, in order to infinitely receive financing 
from the donor.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, I analyze the coordina-
tion between developmental entrepreneurs and distributive planners from 
the aspects of transnational sovereignty and monitoring institutions of the 
European Union. In Section 3, I analyze the role of private information and, 
more specifically, imperfect monitoring in aid effectiveness. Section 4 pro-
vides evaluation evidence from TACIS contracts in the area of social policy 
that were implemented in the former Soviet Union between 1992 and 2007. 
Section 5 concludes.
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Transnational sovereignty and European Union 
aid monitoring
Casella and Eichengreen argue that foreign aid can be conducive to stabili-
zation if it is announced and disbursed early in the inflation process; timing 
seems to play a significant role in aid effectiveness because it affects the 
incentive structures of high and low-cost players in the recipient economy 
(Casella and Eichengreen, 1996). The government is enabled to impose less 
distortionary taxes and still implement a successful stabilization program; 
in any case, foreign aid reduces the distributional costs of inflation among 
interest groups and facilitates macroeconomic adjustment (Casella and 
Eichengreen, 1996). Local aid agents do not come from the federal or 
regional bureaucracy, but civil society, business, and scholarly networks; 
thus, the recipient’s bureaucratic capacity is not eroded by financial incen-
tives provided by the EU to domestic administrators (Knack and Rahman, 
2007). The exclusion of the recipient’s bureaucracy from the core of aid 
implementation generates a direct accountability mechanism between the 
EU and its contractors; thus, central and local bureaucrats do not have any 
of the rent-seeking incentives that are usually produced by the competitive 
supply of multiple aid loans and grants (Knack and Rahman, 2007).
As has been suggested before, the European Commission proposes an 
aid delivery model relying on two types of domestic actors that jointly form 
a transnational sovereignty partnership: developmental entrepreneurs and 
distributive planners. Developmental entrepreneurs substitute for rather 
than complement political entrepreneurs at the civil society level. 
Differentiated forms of non-representative government in Russia, Ukraine, 
and Kazakhstan do not allow the institutional independence of civil society 
from the state and its policy objectives. Given the competition for aid 
resources available to developmental NGOs and businesses, only develop-
mental organizations with a successful implementation record are likely to 
survive for more than one aid delivery period.
Unlike other forms of multilateral or bilateral aid, EU development aid 
has not relied on the corrosion of the recipient’s administrative capacity; aid 
contracts do not serve as indirect bribes to bureaucrats or elected officials. 
Post-Soviet bureaucrats maintain the highest degree of information with 
respect to the needs of the population; this is why the European Commission 
makes its aid delivery decisions based on the information received by the 
recipient governments (Knack and Rahman, 2007). Particularly when it 
comes to the Russian case, Desai et al. indicate that fiscal autonomy in 
Russian regions leads to increased economic growth while at the same time 
creating incentives for rent-seeking both for regional politicians and for 
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local large-scale firms (2005). Thus, they propose a combination of fiscal 
decentralization and political centralization so that growth rates remain high 
and rent-seeking incentives at the local level are eliminated.
Easterly (2002: 241–246) describes foreign aid bureaucracies as a “cartel 
of good intentions”—a cartel which does not intend to sign risky contracts, 
because the marginal cost of monitoring will be higher and the probability of 
success will be lower. This logical pattern may explain why EU aid bureau-
crats are less likely to approve contracts directed to less stable bureaucratic 
environments. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether increased administra-
tive and fiscal independence from the center leads to higher levels of subna-
tional stability. In transition economies, reduced bureaucratic and fiscal 
capacity reveals the institutional dominance of the central government over 
the regional ones. Remmer (2004: 86–89) makes the well-founded statement 
that aid flows increase the size of the public sector in recipient countries; this 
phenomenon consolidates incentives for the increase of public spending 
while creating counterincentives for revenue generation through taxation. 
Boone (1996: 315–317) does not directly test the impact of aid on growth, 
but he focuses on its effect on government consumption; he concludes that 
aid has a strong impact on government consumption, but a very marginal one 
on poverty alleviation.
Governmental accountability is another factor that matters for aid effec-
tiveness. Holmes (1999: 3–4) contends that it should be the key issue in 
foreign aid planning toward Russia; without an accountable government, 
foreign aid delivery will be consistently fragmented. He points out that in a 
country with a tradition of state interventionism, governmental accountabil-
ity should be the policy outcome sought by donors in the first place. This is 
why he proposes solid institutional alliances between the donor, the Russian 
government, and nonstate actors such as NGOs or interest group associa-
tions. The increasing federal concentration of EU development aid to Russia 
can be a useful extension of Holmes’s enlightening take. Donors do not 
want to work with governments that cannot contribute to project success. 
Putin’s federal reforms in 2000 severely weakened Russia’s structure as a 
federal state. The capacity of the Russian Ministry of Justice to prevent 
regional laws from even coming into force, the institutional reinforcement 
of the seven presidential envoys, and the frequent exertion of political pres-
sures on regional courts are clear signs that Russia has been transforming 
itself into a hybrid polity in which formal rules are combined with vertical 
administrative intervention, which is in most cases unconstitutional 
(Hahn, 2001).
It has to be noted here that the existence of developmental NGOs in the 
former Soviet Union depends on the funding they receive from the European 
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Commission or other multilateral institutions that work directly with them 
or through their respective national governments. The more stringent the 
monitoring imposed by the donor, the more objective the criteria for the 
continuation of aid financing and favorable tendering decisions. As men-
tioned previously, informational transfers from post-Soviet recipient gov-
ernments to the European Commission define the policy areas of aid 
contracts decided in Brussels. This is why aid governance in the former 
Soviet Union has been linked with collaborative activity between distribu-
tive planners and developmental entrepreneurs. If post-Soviet planners 
were not committed to the provision of public goods, then EU development 
aid would not have been the main developmental pillar of structural adjust-
ment and transition for all post-Soviet economies. Instead, they would have 
been better off receiving bilateral aid from reciprocal donors or other multi-
lateral organizations (Grigoriadis, 2013: 47–53). Aid disbursed by the latter 
is associated with conditionality ties directed toward the central government 
without further donor supervision or involvement of developmental entre-
preneurs from the donor’s side (Bräutigam, 1992).
EU development aid reflects the institutional structure of the organiza-
tion it comes from; a hybrid governance form that lies between national and 
international structures. Rather than evaluating the aid budget of the 
European Union in terms of the audience costs faced by contributing mem-
ber-states, it is reasonable to argue that their volume of aid participation 
consolidates the policy areas that have been delegated to EU institutions: 
primarily trade, monetary policy, and energy security (Milner, 2006). 
Bräutigam (2000) argues that aid intensity over a protracted period leads to 
aid dependence. Moreover, aid dependence generates a coordination game 
among three sets of players: politicians and bureaucrats, national and 
regional interest groups, and aid organizations (Bräutigam, 2001). The dif-
ference between standard bilateral aid packages and TACIS contracts is that 
aid intensity does not make domestic macroeconomic stability directly con-
tingent on the approval of aid flows by the Commission. Rather than captur-
ing the budgetary balance of the recipient, EU development aid reinforces 
the role of the European Union as the most preferable currency area and 
commercial partner.3 At the same time, it ensures the continuity of energy 
supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan through Ukraine to Western European 
economies. High or low levels of bureaucratic capacity on the recipient’s 
side define the distributive ability of post-Soviet planners, which is the key 
condition for aid effectiveness from the recipient’s perspective. Hefeker and 
Michaelowa (2005: 164–167, 173) evoke the concept of process rather than 
goal-oriented conditionality in order to argue that process conditionality is 
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more inclined to produce pro-poor growth, because it provides them with a 
voice in the aid distribution process.
Commitment to public goods as a strategy can dominate the accumula-
tion of personal rents only when the reform of legal institutions, public 
infrastructure, and social services increases governmental legitimacy and 
improves the performance of post-Soviet bureaucracies. The presence of 
a strong public sector is a key component of EU aid effectiveness, because 
in the post-Soviet space the real institutional choice is not between public 
and privatized governance, but between a strong state and the absence of 
it. Hence, while it maintains its indirect conditionality clauses, EU devel-
opment aid reinforces national development strategies in Russia, Ukraine, 
and Kazakhstan. The treatment of the European Union as a paradigmatic 
set of institutions toward which post-Soviet economies should converge 
is a key normative assumption underpinning the delivery of EU develop-
ment aid in the post-Soviet space.
Transnational sovereignty partnerships are idiosyncratic institutions 
composed of a public core and private entities as implementation 
branches. Contrary to standard public–private partnerships, which have 
considerably reduced transaction costs in aid delivery, EU development 
aid has transformed post-Soviet bureaucracies in an unintended but 
unique way. Transnational sovereignty partnerships are U-form organi-
zations that combine the public mandate of a regional or central bureau-
cracy and the flexibility of civic or corporate organizations. That way, 
they constitute the post-Soviet planner’s institutional response to the 
incentive structure proposed by the TACIS program (Grigoriadis, 
2011).
Zhuravskaya argues that Russian intergovernmental relations in the 
1990s undermined the bureaucratic capacity of local authorities, because 
they stripped them of the option of accumulating their own tax revenue 
base, independently from their hierarchically superior regional and federal 
governments (Zhuravskaya, 2000). What may be inferred from her argu-
ment is that EU development aid, while not offering an autonomous resource 
base for the local administrative planners, supports projects that set com-
mon policy objectives for both the EU and the beneficiary government, 
whether central or regional. In the former Soviet Union, bureaucracies pre-
ceded and often captured transitions to more representative forms of gov-
ernment. Thus, state capacity may not be inherently linked to the 
development of electoral institutions.
Oi (1992) introduces the definition of local state corporatism as a pos-
itive outcome of Chinese fiscal reform. The expansion of the revenue 
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 12, 2015rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Grigoriadis 497
base for local bureaucrats incentivized their transformation into local 
entrepreneurs and thus the creation of a rural industry with public partici-
pation and oversight. In the former Soviet Union, I observe the inverse 
process. Private organizations fulfill the mandate of public agencies and 
thus developmental entrepreneurs become de facto accountable to the 
public officials of their administrative jurisdiction. EU development aid 
strengthens the institutional position of both administrators and local 
entrepreneurs, since the market presence of the latter depends on two fac-
tors: first, political approval by the bureaucracy and second, formation of 
consortia with European NGOs. The inherent contradiction in Russian 
civil society becomes obvious here. Civic organizations and business 
groups must have an ex-ante alignment of their declared organizational 
goals and objectives with central or regional bureaucracies, in order to 
participate in the aid delivery process.
The model
It is now possible to consider an infinitely repeated game with imperfect 
monitoring and two players: the European Commission (EC) and a transna-
tional sovereignty partnership (TSP). The European Commission chooses 
from a set of actions S N F Ri ={ }, , ,  where F stands for its decision to 
refinance an incomplete contract with the same TSP and R denotes its deci-
sion to refinance an incomplete contract with a different TSP; N stands for 
negation to refinance; and the TSP implementing the aid contract is indexed 
by i. The TSP chooses from the set of actions Θi C I= { }, ,  where C denotes 
the completion of the assigned aid contract and I denotes the incomplete 
status of aid tasks assigned after the aid delivery period is over. Each of the 
two players is fully aware of his strategy, but observes only an imperfect— 
private—signal of the other player’s strategy. Hence, it is necessary to 
define the imperfect signal sets for both EC and TSP; these are 
S F N Ri
P P P P={ }, , and ΘiP P PC I={ },  respectively.
There is a probability that player 1 (the European Commission) 
observes the other player’s (TSP) signal incorrectly.4 This may happen 
first when the TSP has completed the contract and the donor thinks that 
it has not done so, and second when the TSP has not completed the con-
tract and the donor thinks that it has done so. Similarly, I define a prob-
ability that player 2 (TSP) observes the other player’s signal 
incorrectly.
Thus, there is the following set of probabilities for player 1:
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Proposition 1
Under imperfect monitoring in EU development aid the donor follows a 
mixed strategy of private signals: he chooses between not refinancing an 
aid contract with the same TSP and hiring a different TSP for its completion 
in a subsequent period.
Corollary 1
The transnational sovereignty partnership as the recipient always opts to 
signal contractual completion.
I derive all equilibria possible when either of the two players does not 
correctly observe the other player’s action and thus has an incentive to devi-
ate. I propose an application of the probability distribution presented by 
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where ξ1 denotes the probability that one of the two players perceives the 
signal incorrectly but not the other, and ξ2 denotes the probability that both 
players perceive the other’s signal incorrectly. When both ξ1 and ξ2 tend to 
zero, perfect monitoring is possible (Sekiguchi, 1997).
The stage game payoffs for the European Commission and the 
Transnational Sovereignty Partnership are defined in the following 
way:
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whereΘt  is the profit for the European Commission derived from aid 
contract completion in period t, Θt+1  is the profit for the European 
Commission when the aid contract is completed in period t+1, Lt  
denotes the cost of completing an aid contract in period t, Lt+1  denotes 
the cost of completing an aid contract in period t+1 with the same TSP, 
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and Lt+1  denotes the cost of contractual completion in period t+1 with a 
different TSP. The normalized ex-ante payoffs, such that 
U N F R C Ii
ex : , , , ,{ }×{ }→   where i=EC, TSP,  have the following form 
(Piccione, 2002):
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where λ ξ ξi = { }1 2, .
The expected payoff of any player i is given by 
V Uit it
Z




∑ , where ψ i  is the strategy played by player i 
and ζ i  is the signal observed by player i (Sekiguchi, 1997). The average 
expected payoff for any player i, when the game is repeated for an infinite 
amount of periods, is F E V ti
t
t






, where π stands 
for the probability distribution function. 
The European Commission is worse off if it accepts refinancing an 
aid contract, when the latter is complete, rather than when it denies 
refinancing an aid contract, when the latter is not complete. It does not 
make a difference for the current TSP whether the European 
Commission denies refinancing or decides to continue aid implemen-
tation with another TSP when the assigned aid contract is already 
complete.
There is one Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, which is N C, .{ }  It is 
also clear that under conditions of perfect information, both the European 
Commission and the TSP have an interest in infinitely playing N C, ;{ }  the 
donor will not have to provide any more financial support and the recipient 
organization will not lose the contract continuation to another TSP. Table 1 
suggests that C is a dominant strategy for TSP.
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Given that TSP will prefer to complete the contract in period 1, I suggest 
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where it is assumed that the European Commission receives a continuation 
payoff W1 when the TSP observes R, and W0 when the TSP observes N. 
Table 1 indicates that R weakly dominates F; this is why the European 
Commission chooses between N and R. 
The solution of this system of equations is given through the following 
steps:
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Then we insert (1) into any of the two system equations and get:
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Then we insert (3) into any of the two system equations and get:
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Table 1. EU development aid as Prisoner’s Dilemma.
TSP→ C I
EC ↓
N θt t,I 0, 0
F −l , l + lt+1 t t+1 θt+1 t+1 t+1l , l−
R −θ θt+1 t, θt+1 t+1 ,0− l
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 12, 2015rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
502 Rationality and Society 25(4)


























, ,ξ ξ ξ ξ
θ




Thus, under conditions of almost perfect monitoring—that is, when 
ξ1 and ξ2  tend to zero—the European Commission is indifferent between 
R and N. The donor knows that contractual completion is always the 
recipient’s best reply. It is also true that the donor will always deny refi-
nancing a complete contract. Nevertheless, the existence of a mixed strat-
egy in private signals allows the donor to threaten an increase in the 
opportunity cost of the recipient by contracting with another TSP without 
reducing his own payoff from aid implementation over an infinite 
horizon.
Aid effectiveness and the TACIS program: 
Evidence from the field
In the former Soviet Union, Russia has been the main focus of EU devel-
opment aid compared to Ukraine and Central Asia. Nevertheless, if one 
compares Figures 1 and 2 (see Appendix 1), the order is reversed when 
TACIS volumes are meas ured in per capita terms; Central Asia ranks first. 
It needs to be stressed here that the large majority of EU development aid 
to Central Asia has been delivered to Kazakhstan. Russia’s federal struc-
ture may explain its top ranking as an aid recipient in aggregate terms. 
Dollar and Levin make an interesting argument regarding the increasing 
selectivity of foreign aid; they state that foreign aid, and especially multi-
lateral aid, is more likely to be directed toward administrative jurisdic-
tions that implement the principles of good governance (Dollar and Levin, 
2004: 14–15).
Figure 3 (see Appendix 1) indicates that economic development and 
financial stability have constituted the first priorities of the European 
Commission with regard to Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Each of 
the five policy areas mentioned in Figure 3 entails a rich set of activi-
ties. Economic cooperation concentrates on economic reforms, devel-
opment of banking and other financial services, and the promotion of 
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SMEs. Utilities and infrastructure contracts focus on energy, science 
and technology, transport, agriculture, and nuclear safety. The cross-
border and neighborhood programs have taken a distinct and explicit 
interest in the regions of Kaliningrad, Baltic Sea, Karelia, the Arctic, 
and Southeast Finland—all regions where the European Union borders 
Russia. The legal and institutional reform sector covers programs 
expanding in the areas of judicial reform, taxation, environmental pro-
tection, public administration, and land reform. Finally, social affairs 
and civil society bring together health and education, social security, 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, and manage-
ment training.
Unlike in Russia, where energy and infrastructural reforms are second to 
financial and private sector development in policy significance, in Ukraine 
the order of policy significance is different. High HIV rates and the lack of 
a solid body of judicial and economic legislation induced aid contracts for 
social protection and legal reform. In Central Asia, the weak institutional 
environment required the reform of public administration as the first prior-
ity undertaken by the recipient government and the European Commission. 
This is the reason why domestic bureaucratic capacity and civil society 
development are predictive factors of aid effectiveness. Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005) suggest that NGO-directed aid has a much more substan-
tial positive effect on infant mortality than aid disbursed to the central gov-
ernment. This implies that NGOs are more consistent than bureaucracies in 
their Millennium Development Goals commitments (Masud and Yontcheva, 
2005: 12–13 and 19–20).
The creation of consortia between European companies and Russian 
NGOs did not allow a lot of space for financial mismanagement on the 
side of the recipient; the European Union has been practically recycling 
its aid flows through European legal persons, which subsequently pro-
vide the aid output to the Russian beneficiary (Ram, 2003). The TACIS 
Institution Building Partnership Program (TACIS IBPP) has been a core 
initiative of the European Commission for the promotion of local devel-
opment and civil society in collaboration with official state structures in 
the Russian regions. The evaluation of TACIS IBPP contracts forms an 
interesting body of evidence explaining the failures and successes of aid 
implementation under conditions of imperfect monitoring. The main 
recipients of this program were civic organizations, regional authorities, 
and nonprofit professional organizations, while the coordinating role was 
assumed by the EU Delegation to Russia (Klaassens et al., 2006a). Under 
the umbrella of IBPP, among others, the following projects were 
considered:
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1. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 01-066.47972, which intended to regulate 
the relationship between regional authorities and independent media 
in Russian towns, between 17 December 2002 and 17 August 2004.
2. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 01-249.47455, with the purpose of 
increasing the living conditions of children that were at risk of aban-
donment by their parents, between 18 December 2002 and 18 
December 2004.
3. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 115-214, on the creation of a cross-bor-
der network of entrepreneurship and development of SMEs in the 
Kaliningrad region and lasted for 18 months.
4. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 03-311, on the assistance of juvenile 
delinquents in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Irkutsk, between January 
2006 and December 2007.
5. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 062-501, which created an NGO in 
Kostroma with the purpose of assisting drug addicts; the financing 
of this institution by the European Commission lasted for two years.
6. TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 03-316, which promoted the social inclu-
sion of disabled children, between April 2005 and April 2007 
(Klaassens et al., 2006b).
The effectiveness of these contracts depended on the intensity of the 
socio-economic problem that they intended to resolve, the degree of col-
laboration between European and Russian partners of the consortium, and 
the ability of regional authorities to create a flexible environment for aid 
implementation. For example, TACIS/IBPP Contract No. 01-249.47455 led 
to a 50% decrease in child abandonments in the period after the contract was 
completed (Klaassens et al., 2006b: 37–40). The overall assessment of the 
TACIS IBPP instrument indicates the significant role played by local and 
regional authorities in the development of civil society. Contracts under the 
institutional framework of IBPP were generally successful, because they 
bolstered an efficient form of cooperation between the two main parts of 
transnational sovereignty partnerships: official state structures of the 
Russian regions, where IBPP was implemented, and the consortia of 
European and Russian legal persons that implemented it. Moreover, it 
became obvious that aid effectiveness at the regional level required a high 
degree of social participation from below.
Nevertheless, administrative delays and lack of effective monitoring of 
the distribution and coordination of bureaucratic tasks posed serious chal-
lenges to IBPP implementation. Replication of the program results in other 
regions or policy areas has not been possible due to the lack of a coherent and 
organized civil society. This reality has been also perpetuated by the absence 
of a serious interregional network among civic organizations on the territory 
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of the recipient. This is the reason why every contract proposed in the frame-
work of IBPP has been very region- and group-specific (ECORYS IBPP, 
2006). As the model in the previous section suggests, aid effectiveness occurs 
when the recipient abides by his contractual obligations to the donor. 
Nevertheless, imperfect monitoring may make the donor less ambitious than 
necessary in defining project objectives.
Furthermore, the TACIS contract on Pension Reform in Russia aimed at 
creating the required legal, institutional, and technical framework for the 
effective delivery of pensions (Barré, 2006). It included the following 
components:
1. Drafting regulations and amendments to the federal laws “On mandatory 
occupation pension systems in the Russian Federation” and “On Labor 
Pensions”;
2. Liberalization in investments of pension savings;
3. Training and operations manuals for employees at the Pension Fund and the 
Ministry of Public Health and Social Development;
4. Creation of an actuarial model setting up efficient replacement rates for the 
pension level of each socio-economic group.
This project required a complete transformation of Russia’s pension sys-
tem such that the poor could continue paying their social insurance contri-
butions while the federal government could keep paying pensions that cover 
the people’s basic needs and prevent structural mistakes in the allocation of 
investment funds.
The intervention of many political actors in the discussion of the federal 
law “On mandatory occupation pension systems in the Russian Federation” 
undermined the implementation of this TACIS contract (Barré, 2006: 
29–33). The participation of multiple administrative agencies such as the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Public 
Health and Social Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the Legal 
Department of the Presidential Administration delayed the State Duma’s 
confirmation of this federal law. Moreover, the President’s decision to draft 
a law in support of families with many children demanded a reconsideration 
of many financial aspects of the proposed reform package.
Nevertheless, the delay in the State Duma’s passing of the basic law 
does not suggest that the TACIS contract on pension reform was not suc-
cessful. On the contrary, it was the first major effort to reorganize the 
delivery of pensions to the majority of Russians in a way that improved 
their life quality and increased their life span. European and Russian 
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contractors as well as subcontractors—Arcadis BMB Management 
Consultants and East-West Institute from the European side, and the 
Institute of Labor and Social Insurance from the Russian side—provided 
high-quality services that not only improved the training of actuarial pro-
fessionals in the Russian Pension Fund but also revised the current 
replacement rate (Barré, 2006: 29–33).
Last but not least, the TACIS contracts on social protection in Russia 
between 1991 and 1999 were effective to the extent that they were able to 
address the key problems of the Russian public administration and provide 
useful solutions. Also in that case, the cooperation between TACIS officials 
and the Russian government was not ideal due to frequent miscommunications 
and mutual distrust experienced at many implementation phases of these con-
tracts (DRN-Linden Staff, 2000). Moreover, the cooperation between European 
Commission experts and Russian consultants participating in the project was 
not direct or easy. Hence, administrative capacity is not the only factor that 
matters in aid effectiveness. What also matters is the compatibility between the 
delivery mechanisms of the donor and the operational mechanisms of the 
recipient. Domestic political conditions such as corruption, cronyism, and 
bureaucratic freeriding can pose important constraints to aid effectiveness, but 
do not offset the recipient’s incentives for aid implementation.
Discussion
EU development aid to the former Soviet Union includes two types of compro-
mise: the donor is required to adjust to the recipient’s policy choices, and the 
recipient needs to abide by the donor’s rules to receive development aid. Aid is 
effective when its respective aid contract is implemented. The observation of 
private signals by both the European Commission and the TSP leads to an 
interaction modeled as an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. When the 
recipient is uncertain about future aid rents by the donor and the donor about 
contractual completion by the recipient, the TSP is always likely to complete 
the assigned aid contract. The European Commission  follows a mixed strategy 
between not refinancing the contract and continuing with another TSP in the 
subsequent period. Hence, imperfect monitoring makes the European 
Commission indifferent between signaling abstention from refinancing the 
current TSP and collaboration with another TSP in the next period. At the same 
time, when the TSP is not certain about the continuity of aid flows in the future, 
it is more inclined to fulfill the aid contract in the current  period.
This paper suggests that the effectiveness of EU development aid in the 
former Soviet Union is facilitated by the internal structure of the recipient, 
which allows the donor to threaten him with termination of aid flows. 
Evidence from the field confirms that contractual completion does not 
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always imply aid effectiveness. Institutional deficiencies in transition econ-
omies and divergence between the conditions of the donor and the capacity 
of the recipient have been the main constraints to the effectiveness of the 
TACIS Program. The distinction between distributive planners and devel-
opment entrepreneurs reveals a hierarchical relationship between the state 
and civil society in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. 
Moreover, it unfolds the lack of horizontal structures in Russian-style 
economic systems and the inability of civil society to act independently 
from the state in policy implementation and the provision of public goods. 
Nevertheless, the formation of TSPs, whose internal structure reflects the 
principal–agent relationship between the state and civil society in the post-
Soviet space, has had primarily positive implications for aid effectiveness. 
The central role of the recipient’s bureaucracy, not only as a beneficiary of 
development aid but also as a participant in the aid delivery process, has 
induced a higher degree of cooperativeness with donor institutions. This is 
particularly the case when the TACIS program is compared to other models 
of development aid delivery which have been directed to the developing 
world. In order to fulfill their strategic role as players in the delivery of EU 
development aid, post-Soviet bureaucracies have been inclined to contrib-
ute toward contractual completion rather than continue to derive rents from 
the partial fulfillment or failure of aid programs. Experience from the 
TACIS program suggests that a strong recipient bureaucracy can be benefi-
cial and not detrimental to aid effectiveness under conditions of imperfect 
monitoring. This occurs when the recipient has the dual capacity of benefi-
ciary and institutional stakeholder in the development aid process.
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Notes
1. There is continuity in the maintenance of a social welfare optimum both under 
socialism and during the transition period; see Way (2002: 579–598); Collier 
and Way (2004: 258–284).
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2. Contrary to Boschini and Olofsgard (2007: 1–33).
3. As Cassels (1996) argues, budget support alone is not an efficient solution. 
On the contrary, a combination of developmental instruments and objectives is 
more preferable.
4. The structure of the game applies the key theoretical contributions presented in 
Sekiguchi (1997) and Piccione (2002).
References
Akram T (2003) The international foreign aid regime: who gets foreign aid and how 
much? Applied Economics 35(11): 1351–1356.
Barré X (2006) Pension reform in the Russian Federation: Final report, TACIS con-
tract no. 2003/071-225, Arcadis EMB Management Consultants, 2006.
Boone P (1996) Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. European Economic 
Review 40(2): 289–329.
Boschini A and Olofsgard A (2007) Foreign aid: an instrument for fighting commu-
nism? Journal of Development Studies 43(4): 622–648.
Bräutigam D (1992) Governance, economy and foreign aid. Studies in Comparative 
International Development 27(3): 3–25.
Bräutigam D (2000) Aid dependence and governance. Expert Group on Development 
Issues, Working Paper 1, Division for International Development Cooperation, 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm. 
Casella A and Eichengreen B (1996) Can foreign aid accelerate stabilization? 
Economic Journal 106(436): 605–619.
Cassels A (1996) Aid instruments and health systems development: an analysis of 
current practice. Health Policy and Planning 11(4): 354–368.
Collier P and Dollar D (2004) Development effectiveness: what have we learnt?  
The Economic Journal 114(496): 244–271.
Collier SJ and Way L (2004) Beyond the deficit model: social welfare in post-Soviet 
Georgia. Post-Soviet Affairs 20(3): 258–284.
Desai RM, Freinkman L and Goldberg I (2005) Fiscal federalism in rentier regions: 
evidence from Russia. Journal of Comparative Economics 33: 814–834.
Dollar D and Levin V (2004) The increasing selectivity of foreign aid 1984–2002. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3299, May, Washington, D.C.
DRN-Linden Staff (2000) An evaluation of the TACIS country program in Russia: 
Final synthesis report, development researchers. Network-Linden Consulting 
Partnership, Brussels, January 2000.
Easterly W (2002) The cartel of good intentions: the problem of bureaucracy in 
foreign aid. Journal of Economic Policy Reform 5(4): 223–250.
Grigoriadis T (2011) Aid effectiveness and the soft budget constraint: EU develop-
ment aid to the former Soviet Union. Economics Letters 112: 287–289.
Grigoriadis T (2013) Aid effectiveness and donor preferences: European Aid 
Systems in the former Soviet Union, 1992–2007. Journal of International 
Development 25: 45–66.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 12, 2015rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Grigoriadis 509
Hahn GM (2001) Putin’s “Federal Revolution”: the administrative and judicial reform 
of Russian Federalism. East European Constitutional Review 10(1): 60–67.
Hefeker C and Michaelowa K (2005) Can process conditionality enhance aid effec-
tiveness? The role of bureaucratic interest and public pressure. Public Choice 
122: 159–175.
Holmes S (1999) Can foreign aid promote the rule of law? East European 
Constitutional Review 8(4): 68–74.
Klaassens E, Lyudmila I, Paul H, et al. (2006a) Evaluation IBPP Russia, Framework 
Contraction Commission EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Lot no. 4: Sector and pro-
ject evaluations, specific contract: 2006/116626, Draft final report, ECORYS 
Nederland BV, November 2006, Moscow/Rotterdam.
Klaassens E, Lyudmila I, Paul H, et al. (2006b) Evaluation IBPP Russia, Framework 
Contraction Commission EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Lot no. 4: Sector and pro-
ject evaluations, specific contract: 2006/116626, Draft Annexes, ECORYS 
Nederland BV, November 2006, Moscow/Rotterdam.
Knack S and Rahman A (2007) Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid 
recipients. Journal of Development Economics 83: 176–197.
Krueger AO (1980) Trade policy as an input to development. American Economic 
Review 70(2): 288–292. Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association.
Krueger AO (1986) Aid in the development process. World Bank Research Observer 
1(1): 57–78.
Masud N and Yontcheva B (2005) Does foreign aid reduce poverty? Empirical evi-
dence from nongovernmental and bilateral aid. IMF Working Paper 05/100, 
May 2005, Washington D.C.
Milner HV (2006) Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems. In: Hawkins 
DG, David AL, Daniel LN, et al. (eds) Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 4, 
pp. 107–139.
Oi JC (1992) Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism 
in China. World Politics 45(1): 99–126.
Olson M Jr (1963) Rapid growth as a destabilizing force. Journal of Economic 
History 23(4): 529–552.
Piccione M (2002) The repeated prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect private monitor-
ing. Journal of Economic Theory 102: 70–83.
Ram R (2003) Roles of bilateral and multilateral aid in economic growth of develop-
ing countries. Kyklos 56(1): 95–110.
Remmer KL (2004) Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government? 
American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 77–92.
Sekiguchi T (1997) Efficiency in repeated prisoner’s dilemma with private monitor-
ing. Journal of Economic Theory 76: 345–361.
Way L (2002) The dilemmas of reform in post-soviet states. Politics & Society 
30(4): 579–598.
Zhuravskaya EV (2000) Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, 
Russian style. Journal of Public Economics 76: 337–368.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 12, 2015rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
510 Rationality and Society 25(4)
Appendix 1
Figure 1. The TACIS Program to Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia (aggregate).
Source: EU Delegation to the Russian Federation. EuropeAid CRIS Data, Moscow, 2007.
Figure 2. The TACIS Program to Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia (per capita).
Source: EU Delegation to the Russian Federation. EuropeAid CRIS Data. Moscow, 2007; 
Federal Service of Statistics, Russia, 2010; State Service of Statistics, Ukraine, 2010; Statistics 
Agency, Kazakhstan, 2010.
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Figure 3. Policy Areas of TACIS Contracts.
Source: EU Delegation to the Russian Federation. EuropeAid CRIS Data, Moscow, 2007.
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